Abstract. Aggregate signatures are useful in special areas where the signatures on many different messages generated by many different users need to be compressed. Very recently, Xiong et al. proposed a certificateless aggregate signature scheme provably secure in the random oracle model under the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. Unfortunately, by giving two kinds of concrete attacks, we indicate that the certificateless aggregate signature scheme of Xiong et al. does not meet the basic requirement of unforgeability.
Introduction
In traditional public key cryptography, the authenticity of public keys is ensured by certificates signed by a certificate authority (CA). But the issues associated with certificate management are quite complex and costly. In 1984, Shamir [1] first invented a new paradigm called Identity Based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) which eliminates the need for certificate by deriving public keys for users directly from their identity information, such as e-mail address, telephone number or other identifiers. However, in ID-PKC a trusted third party called Private Key Generator (PKG) must be employed to generate the user's private key. Clearly, a malicious PKG can decrypt any ciphertext and forge the signature of any user. So ID-PKC suffers from an inherent problem namely key escrow.
To overcome the key escrow problem of ID-PKC, Al-Riyami and Paterson [2] proposed a new notion called certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) in 2003. CL-PKC effectively solves the inherent key escrow problem in ID-PKC while keeps its certificate-free property. Similar to ID-PKC, CL-PKC also uses a third party called Key Generation Center (KGC) to help a user to generate his private key. However, KGC can only provide the partial private key for the user. The full private key is finally generated by the user who makes use of the secret value chosen by himself and the partial private key obtained from the KGC. The public key of the user is computed from his secret value and the KGC's public parameters, and it is published by the user himself. One of the most important primitives in public key cryptography is digital signature. Designing a high secure and efficient signature scheme is always desirable since we sometimes have to work in environments with low computability, low-bandwidth communication and low-storage. And an aggregate signature scheme is a signature scheme in which multiple signatures can be compressed into one single signature. The validity of an aggregate signature will convince a verifier that the n users did indeed sign the n original messages. The advantages of CL-PKC, such as escrow-free and certificate-free, may enable the wide use of certificateless signatures (CLS). In fact, there may be some cases of synchronously transmitting and verifying many different signatures signed by many signers. So, it is natural to consider to extend the notion of aggregate signatures to certificateless public key settings to get certificateless aggregate signatures (CLAS), which can aggregate many different certificateless signatures into one single signature, and effectively reduce the message size and verification cost. So, it is interesting to study secure and efficient constructions of aggregate signatures in CL-PKC.
The aggregate signature scheme was proposed by Boneh et al. [3] in which many different messages generated by many different signatures can be compressed into one single signature. Since then, many papers in this area have been published in traditional PKC [4] [5] [6] . The first Identity-based aggregate signature (IDAS) scheme was presented by Cheon et al. [7] . Later Cheng et al. [8] , Xu et al. [9] , Gentry and Ramzan [10] , and Selvi et at. [11] introduced some efficient IDAS schemes, respectively. In recent years, much attention has been paid to the study of CL-PKC. So, the concept of certificateless aggregate signature (CLAS) has been introduced and several CLAS schemes have been proposed [12] [13] [14] [15] . Very recently, Xiong et al. [16] introduced a new efficient certificateless aggregate signature scheme in which the signers do not need to be synchronized and its performance is comparable to the most efficient up-to-date schemes. They also claimed that their scheme was provably secure under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. Unfortunately, their Security proof is not sound and their scheme is in fact insecure.
In this paper, we show that the CLAS scheme in [16] is flawed by demonstrating two kinds of attacks against it. In our first attack, we show that a Type I adversary who replaces one user's public key of an aggregating set U can forge a valid aggregate signature to a receiver. Similarly, in the second attack, we show that a Type II adversary who knows master key may impersonate any identity of an aggregating set U to generate a valid aggregate signature. Therefore, the scheme [16] is subject to the universal forgery of Type I and Type II adversaries. Thus, the original CLAS scheme of Xiong et al. [16] fails to achieve the security goal for an aggregate signature scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some preliminaries. Section 3 introduces the definition and the security notions for CLAS schemes. Section 4 reviews the CLAS scheme of Xiong et al. [16] . And Section 5 presents the attacks on Xiong et al.'s scheme. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper.
Preliminaries
This section revisits some basic concepts and necessary complexity assumptions.
Bilinear pairing
Let G 1 and G 2 denote two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order q, and g be a generator of
is called a bilinear pairing if it satisfies the following properties:
There exits an efficient algorithm to computeê(g, h) for all g, h ∈ G 2 .
Complexity Assumptions
Discrete Logarithm (DL) Problem: Given a generator g of a cyclic group G with order q, and h ∈ G to find an integer a ∈ Z * q such that h = g a . The DL assumption means that there is no polynomial time algorithm to solve the DL problem in (g, h, G) with non-negligible advantage.
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem: Given a generator g of a cyclic group G with order p, and given (g a , g b ) for unknown a, b ∈ Z * q , to compute g ab . The CDH assumption means that there is no polynomial time algorithm to solve the CDH problem in (g, g a , g b , G) with non-negligible advantage.
3 Certificateless Aggregate Signature(CLAS)
Formal Definition of Certificateless Aggregate Signature schemes
A generic certificateless aggregate signature scheme is defined by six algorithms [14, 16] : MasterKeyGen, Partial-Private-Key-Extract, UserKeyGen, Sign, Aggregate and Aggregate Verify. The description of each algorithm is as follows.
MasterKeyGen: This algorithm is performed by KGC that accepts a security parameter k to generate a master key and a list of system parameters params.
PartialPrivateKeyGen: This algorithm is performed by KGC that accepts a user's identity ID i , a parameter list params and a master key to produce the user's partial private key psk ID i .
UserKeyGen: An algorithm run by a user that takes as input the user's identity ID i , and selects a random x ID i ∈ Z * q , outputs the user's secret/public key pair (usk ID i , upk ID i ). Sign: An algorithm run by each user U i in an aggregating set U. U i 's inputs are the parameter list params, his identity ID i , a signing key (psk ID i , usk ID i ) and a message m i ∈ {0, 1} * . The output of U i is a signature σ i .
Aggregate: An algorithm run by the aggregate signature generator that takes as inputs an aggregating set U of n users {U 1 , · · · , U n }, the identity ID i of each user U i , the corresponding public key upk ID i of U i , and a signature σ i on a message m i under identity ID i and public key upk ID i for each user U i ∈ U. The output of this algorithm is an aggregate signature σ on messages {m 1 , · · · , m n }.
Aggregate Verify: This algorithm takes as input an aggregating set U of n users {U 1 , · · · , U n }, the identity ID i and a corresponding public key upk ID i of each user U i , an aggregate signature σ on messages {m 1 , · · · , m n }. It outputs true if the aggregate signature is valid, or false otherwise.
Security requirements of Certificateless Aggregate Signature
The basic security requirements for an aggregate signature scheme is unforgeability. Intuitively, we say that an aggregate signature scheme offers unforgeability if nobody can generate a valid aggregate signature on behalf of a generator without the possession of the full private key at least one of the users. Precise definitions of unforgeability is defined using security models. For the detail, please refer to [14, 16] .
As defined in [14, 15, 17] , there are two types of adversary with different capabilities.
Type I Adversary: This type of adversary A I models a malicious adversary which does not have access to the master key, but A I has the ability to replace the public key of any entity with a value of his choice, because there is no certificate involved in CLAS schemes.
Type II Adversary: This type of adversary A II has access to the master key but can not perform public key replacement.
Revisiting the CLAS scheme of Xiong et al.
In this section, we will review the CLAS scheme of Xiong et al. [16] . Let G 1 and G 2 denote two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p and letê : G 1 × G 1 −→ G 2 be a bilinear pairing.
MasterKeyGen: Given a security parameter k ∈ Z, the algorithm works as follows: 1) Run the parameter generator on input k to generate a prime q, two groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order q, two different generators P and Q in G 1 and an admissible paringê :
2) Select a master key s ∈ R Z * q and set P pub = sP . 3) Choose cryptographic hash functions H 0 , H 0 : {0, 1} * → G 1 and H 1 , H 2 , H 2 : {0, 1} * → Z * q . The security analysis will review H 1 and H 2 as random oracles. The system parameters are {q, G 1 , G 2 ,ê, P, Q, P pub , H 0 , H 0 , H 1 , H 2 , H 2 }. The master key is s.
PartialPrivateKeyGen: Given a user's identity ID i ∈ {0, 1} * , KGC first computes
It then sets this user's partial key psk ID i = (sQ ID i , sQ ID i ) and transmits it to user ID i secretly. UserKeyGen: The user ID i selects a secret value x ID i ∈ R Z * q as his secret key usk ID i , and computes his public key as upk ID i = x ID i P .
Sign: Given its signing key (usk ID i , psk ID i ), and a message m i ∈ {0, 1} * , the signer, whose identity is ID i and the corresponding public key is upk ID i performs the following steps.
1) Compute
3) Output σ i as the signature on m i . Aggregate: Anyone can act as an aggregate signature generator who can aggregate a collection of individual signatures. For an aggregating set U of n users {U 1 , · · · , U n } with identities {ID 1 , · · · , ID n } and the corresponding public keys {upk 1 , · · · , upk n }, and message-signature pairs (m 1 , σ 1 ), · · · , (m n , σ n ) from {U 1 , · · · , U n } respectively, the aggregate signature generator computes σ = n i=1 σ i and output σ as an aggregate signature. Aggregate Verify: To verify an aggregate signature σ signed by n users {U 1 , · · · , U n } with identities {ID 1 , · · · , ID n } and the corresponding public keys {upk 1 , · · · , upk n } on messages {m 1 , · · · , m n }, the verifier performs the following steps.
1) For i = 1, · · · , n, compute
2) Verify the equation
If it holds, accept the signature; else reject it.
5 Security Analysis of the CLAS Scheme by Xiong et al.
In this section, we describe our attacks on Xiong et al.'s scheme [16] to show its security vulnerabilities. Let {U 1 , · · · , U n } be an aggregating set of n users with identities {ID 1 , · · · , ID n } and the corresponding public keys {upk 1 , · · · , upk n } on messages {m 1 , · · · , m n }.
An Attack on Xiong et al.'s scheme Using Type I Adversary
As defined in [14, 15] , a certificateless aggregate signature scheme is existentially unforgeable iff it resists against type I and type II adversaries. Recall that a type I adversary A I does not posses the knowledge of the master key, but the adversary can perform public key replacement, i.e. replacing the public key with his choice. We will show that the scheme in [16] does not resist against a type I adversary since the adversary can successfully forge a valid aggregate signature by replacing one user's public key. The concrete attack is described in four stages. Stage 1: In this stage, A I randomly chooses an identity, without losing generality, A I chooses ID n and picks x IDn ∈ R Z * q , computes upk IDn = x IDn P , and replaces the ID n 's public key upk IDn with upk IDn .
Stage 2: A I queries the Super-Sign oracle for the signature of m i for ID i (i = 1, · · · , n − 1). Let {σ 1 , · · · , σ n−1 } be the output of the Super-Sign oracle.
Stage 3: A I picks m, m ∈ {0, 1} * (m, m = m i , i = 1, · · · , n), queries the Super-Sign oracle for the signatures of (ID n , m) and (ID n , m ). {σ n , σ n } be the output of the Super-Sign oracle. Then A I computes
So, A I has the equations
A I can easily obtain the solutions sQ IDn , sQ IDn from the equations. Then A I computes
Here, σ * n is a forged signature of (ID n , m n ) and is not the output of the Super-Sign oracle. Since we havê e(σ * , P ) =ê(
the verification equation always holds. This declares that the forged aggregate signature σ * is valid. Therefore, the scheme is subject to universal forgery with respect to a Type I adversary A I who replaces one of the identities's public key.
An Attack on Xiong et al.'s scheme Using Type II Adversary
Recall that a type II adversary A II is given the master key, but can not replace any public keys. In most security models, A II is just like a "malicious − but − passive" KGC. We will show that the scheme in [16] does not resist against a type II adversary since A II can successfully forge a valid aggregate signature. The concrete attack is described in four stages.
Stage 1: In this stage, A II randomly chooses an identity, without losing generality, A II chooses ID n and picks m n ∈ {0, 1} * (m n = m i , i = 1, · · · , n). A II queries the Super-Sign oracle for the signature of m n for ID n . Let σ n be the output of the Super-Sign oracle.
Stage 2: A II computes
So, A I has the equation
Since A II kmows the master key, s, it can easily obtain the solution (x IDn · Q) from the equation. Then A II computes h n1 = H 1 (m n , ID n , upk IDn ), h n2 = H 2 (m n , ID n , upk IDn ), h n2 = H 2 (m n , ID n , upk IDn ) and σ n = h n1 · (x IDn · Q) + h n2 · sQ IDn + h n2 · sQ IDn
Here, σ n is a forged signature of (ID n , m n ) and is not the output of the Super-Sign oracle. 
It is clear that σ * is a valid aggregate signature since the verification equation always holds:
e(σ * , P ) =ê(
(h i2 Q ID i + h i2 Q ID i ), P pub )
Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrated two kinds of concrete attacks against the recently proposed CLAS scheme by Xiong et al. according to their security model. In our attacks, a Type I adversary can forge a valid aggregate signature by replacing the public key of one of the identities, and a Type II adversary can forge a valid aggregate signature by using the master key. Thus, the CLAS scheme by Xiong et al. fails to meet the requirement of unforgeability for a secure aggregate signature scheme.
